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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
CONSTETUTIONAL LAW
LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Judicial power in the American legal system is divided into two ele-
ments: the tribunal and the authority. The tribunals are specifically
created as constitutional courts: in the federal constitution,' one supreme
court and such inferior courts as the Congress may establish; in the Ohio
Constitution,' a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas,
courts of probate, and such other courts inferior to courts of appeals as
may be established. The element of judicial power identified as the au-
thority for the courts to act has not been so dearly specified. Ever since
the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison8 the courts have been involved
in a process of constant intellectual ferment as they seek to delimit their
authority in relation to the legislative and executive branches and be-
tween various levels of government - federal, state, and local. In cases
reported last year, the Ohio judiciary grappled with several interesting
issues involving judicial power.
The supreme court in an original mandamus action did not hesitate
to compel the Cleveland City Council to comply with the mandatory
charter provision requiring periodic reapportionment of city voting dis-
tricts. It had been contended that this matter was legislative, political,
and outside judicial authority. Without dissent the court held this was
valid judicial action.4
The constitutional authority of the jury to assess compensation for
property taken in condemnation proceedings is another facet of the judi-
cial authority. The legislature can provide that the jury should find and
return such verdicts separately upon each claim. Such legislative action
is not an invasion of the judicial authority as expressed in the Ohio Con-
stitution, because the matter is merely procedural.'
On the other hand, the judicial authority over direct contempt of the
court is not subject to legislative limitation. A defendant, who removed
securities from a deposit box in violation of a court order, converted them
to cash, and deposited the cash in undisclosed banks whose names he re-
fused to divulge, can be imprisoned by the court until he identifies the
banks.6
1. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1.
2. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1.
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 135 (1803).
4. State ex tel. Scott v. Masterson, 173 Ohio St. 402, 183 N.E.2d 376 (1962). Cf. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in which the Supreme Court held it within the judicial authority
to compel congressional redistricting in Tennessee.
5. In re Appropriation of Easements for Highway Purposes, 172 Ohio St. 524, 178 N.E.2d
787 (1961).
6. In re Roberts, 185 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
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Judicial authority also plays a significant role within the court hier-
archy. Actions under statutes prescribing certain procedures available to
municipal boards of health or general health districts to abate nuisances
must be brought before a county court within the county, or before a
mayor or police judge of the municipality. A municipal court is without
jurisdiction.' Also, after a common pleas court has acquired full jurisdic-
tion over a partition action, the probate court cannot compel the guardian
to dismiss the action.'
The harshness of a rule fixing the time period for completing a bill
of exceptions is a problem for the legislature and not one for the courts,
so the judiciary cannot extend this time period. Legislative authority
supersedes judicial authority in this matter.9
Other decisions involving judicial authority were rendered in 1962.
In considering the denial of a variance request by a Board of Zoning Ad-
justment, one court emphasized the vital distinction between administra-
tive power and judicial power:
[W]e would conclude that if the intent of the General Assembly was
to make this Court a super administrator of all final orders of officers,
boards, etc of all political subdivisions of this State, it would have no
such power. This would be the necessary effect of any holding that
the appeal is truly de novo in the sense that the Court would, by appeal,
possess all of the power of the tribunal appealed from. We must pre-
sume, however, that such constitutional limitations were borne in mind,
and that no such intent existed. Thus, the language 'unsupported by
the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence' does
not and cannot mean that a court in such an appeal may merely deter-
mine the issues in the light of the action the judge would have taken had
he been a member of the Board whose order is being appealed. In
order to confer the exercise of judicial power, it must mean something
other than this.'0 (Emphasis added.)
In reviewing zoning orders, the judicial authority extends to deter-
mining whether the board action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
The judge must not sit as an administrative zoning officer, imposing his
administrative opinion on the wisdom of the zoning order. Judicial au-
thority does not extend constitutionally into this administrative function.
Finally, judicial authority, as represented by the constitutional provi-
sion guaranteeing that the courts shall be open to every wronged person,
is not violated by the arbitration statutes or agreements to arbitrate."
The judicial process need not be the exclusive method for settling legal
disputes in modern society.
7. State v. Reynolds, 113 Ohio App. 469, 178 N.E.2d 842 (1960).
8. Child v. Snyder, 181 N.E.2d 315 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
9. Zimmerman v. White-Roth Machine Corp., 182 NE.2d 880 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
10. Broad-Miami Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 185 N.E.2d 76, 79 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
11. Tuschman Steel Co. v. Tuschman, 181 N.E.2d 322 (Ohio CP. 1961).
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LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
As the limitations on judicial power are a constant constitutional
problem, legislative limitations are also a legal challenge. The General
Assembly can by legislation authorize the State Board of Education to
approve finally the annexation of a school district territory to another
school district in a municipality. The issue arose when a municipality
annexed territory for municipal purposes and the annexed territory had
its own school district. No standards for the annexation approval ex-
isted, but this failure was held not to be fatal to that approval. In the
court's opinion no unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
State Board had occurred.' 2 Likewise the state legislature can constitu-
tionally delegate to the State Board of Education authority to divide
"equitably" the funds and indebtedness between school districts involved
in territory transfers. No legislative standards beyond the term "equit-
ably" need be set forth.'3
Also legislative authority was not unconstitutionally delegated to the
Tax Commission in the requirement that a party objecting to a highway
use tax assessment must post bonds "satisfactory" to the Commissioner.
The bonds were conditioned upon payment of the tax as finally deter-
mined. This legislative standard was held to be adequate for valid ad-
ministrative action.'4
An interesting political issue involving the filling of vacancies in the
office of clerk of courts pursuant to a 1961 legislative provision" arose
in State ex rel. Hayes v. Jennings."6 The Revised Code was amended to
authorize members of the central committee of the political party to
which the vacating officeholder belonged to appoint his successor. This
procedure is not the appointment of an individual to an office by the
General Assembly which would be prohibited under article II, section 27
of the Ohio Constitution.
Finally, the 1959 amendment entitling the unemployment compen-
sation claimant to redetermination and recomputation of future weekly
unemployment benefits was held not to be a legislative exercise of a judi-
cial power in violation of the constitution."*
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In State ex rel. Vitoratos v. Yacobucci 8 the Ohio Supreme Court held
that a criminal defendant who had exhausted his right to appeal in one
12. Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 173 Ohio St. 130, 180 N.E.2d 576 (1962).
13. State ex rel. Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 172 Ohio St. 533, 179 N.E.2d 347 (1961).
14. Riss & Co. v. Bowers, 114 Ohio App. 429, 182 N.E.2d 862 (1961).
15. OHIO REV. CODE § 305.02 (Supp. 1962).
16. 173 Ohio St. 370, 182 N.E.2d 546 (1962).
17. General Indus. Co. v. Leach, 173 Ohio St. 227, 181 N.E.2d 39 (1962).
18. 173 Ohio St. 462, 184 N.E.2d 98 (1962).
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case and voluntarily dismissed his appeal in another was not entitled to
compel by mandamus the furnishing of the warrant, the copy of the jury
venire, affadavits, and the copy of the impaneled jury. Procedural due
process had not been denied.
In unemployment compensation procedure, the employer who re-
ceives notice of (1) eligibility for unemployment benefits, (2) allow-
ance of the first claim, (3) allowance of additional claims, and (4) de-
termination of the employer's tax rate has had adequate due process pro-
tection. The failure to provide additional notice of the allowance of con-
tinuing weekly benefits for unemployment is not a denial of this constitu-
tional right."
The legislative enactment requiring three-days notice of the intention
to introduce evidence of an alibi in criminal proceedings also withstood
attack as a denial of due process."0
A court of appeals found no ascertainable standard of conduct in the
legislative definition of a misdemeanor for keeping any animal which
"emits audible sounds" to the "annoyance" of inhabitants. The lack of
certainty and definiteness was held to be a denial of due process.?'
A trial court declared unconstitutional a statute making it illegal to
manufacture a device for a policy or numbers game. The statute did not
require any knowledge or intent that such a device be used for illegal
gambling. For this reason, the due process requirement of the fourteenth
amendment of the United 'States Constitution was held to have been
violated. 2
SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Interstate Commerce
In the federal-state commerce area the primary and almost exclusive
constitutional litigation today encompasses state taxation of interstate
commerce. In 1961 the Ohio Supreme Court held that an Ohio manu-
facturer which fabricates precast concrete walls and ships them directly
to out-of-state building sites is liable as a consumer for sales tax on the
cost of materials consumed in construction. Further, a court of appeals
19. State ex rel. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Leach, 173 Ohio St. 397, 183 N.E.2d 369
(1962). See also Warren Sanitary Milk Co. v. Board of Review, 179 N.E.2d 385 (Ohio C.P.
1961), where the Unemployment Compensation Administration issued a reconsideration de-
cision affirming the disallowance of compensation claims. Claimants then filed an appeal
with the Board of Review. The employer was not given notice of the time and place of the
hearing. The board referee heard the claim and reversed the administrator. No notice of this
decision was given to the employer. The court held the employer was an interested party en-
titled to notice in order to meet the requirement of procedural due process.
20. State v. Cunningham, 185 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
21. City of Columbus v. Becher, 115 Ohio App. 239, 184 N.E.2d 617 (1961).
22. State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 182 N.E.2d 641 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
23. Marietta Concrete Corp. v. Bowers, 172 Ohio St. 475, 178 N.E.2d 504 (1961).
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held a foreign trucking firm liable for the highway use tax on its inter-
state operations over Ohio highways.24
Religion
Can a person soliciting charitable contributions while operating a
revival meeting in a rented theater be required to register with the munic-
ipality? A court of appeals answered this question in the affirmative.25
The Cincinnati ordinance which was enforced exempted such solicitations
by members of an established and bona fide organization and also ex-
empted collections taken at regular assemblies or services.
If a reputable physician certifies that an emergency blood transfusion
is required for a three-year-old child, the court under Ohio Revised Code
section 2151.33 may summarily order such medical treatment even
though the parents are Jehovah Witnesses who oppose the transfusion
on religious grounds. No denial of religious liberty will occur.2"
Equal Protection
The Ohio Intangible Tax Act does not deny equal protection if in-
terpreted to mean that distribution by a corporation of its preferred stock
dividend on a share-for-share basis to common stockholders is income
yield. If the distribution had been made as a stock split and recapitali-
zation, a tax would not have accrued. This creation of two different classi-
fications was not unreasonable under the equal protection concept.
Freedom of the Press
Current cases in this area have been concerned with the constitution-
al issue: what is obscenity? The constitutional application of knowingly
possessing obscene materials 8 had a severe test last year.
In one case the defendant owned a stored auto trailer. It was locked
with chains and padlocks and contained a large quantity of packaged
duplicate pornographic material of the vilest kind. The accused had
visited this trailer several times during the year prior to his arrest. When
arrested he was leaving the storage place with a package resembling
those found in the trailer, and he possessed keys fitting the padlock. It
was held to be constitutional to apply the criminal statute under these
conditions to the defendant.
29
The exhibition of the motion picture "The Lovers" also was held to
24. Riss & Co. v. Bowers, 114 Ohio App. 429, 182 N.E.2d 862 (1961).
25. City of Cincinnati v. Epley, 185 N.E.2d 483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
26. Ex rel. Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
27. Cobourn v. Bowers, 173 Ohio St. 4, 179 N.E.2d 354 (1962). Two judges dissented
as to the interpretation of "income" under the statute. Id. at 11, 179 N.E.2d at 359.
28. OHio REV. CODE § 2905.34 (Supp. 1962).
29. State v. Wetzel, 173 Ohio St. 16, 179 N.E.2d 773, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 62 (1962).
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violate the criminal code prohibition against knowingly exhibiting or
possessing an obscene film. After the supreme court viewed the film, the
majority stated: "Les Amants (The Lovers) was not hard-core pornogra-
phy, i.e., filth for filth's sake. It was worse. It was filth for money's
sake." Judge Taft concurred in the affirmation of the conviction on the
ground that reasonable minds could determine beyond a reasonable doubt
that the film was obscene. He did not believe he was required to make
a personal judgment on the film."0
Taking Property
The state and local police power to regulate the use of property for
safety, health, welfare, or moral purposes dashes with the individual's
right to have his property protected. The judiciary must constantly bal.
ance these opposing forces to provide orderly security in the community.
Even municipal corporations have the right to property protection
vis-h-vis state regulation. In 1962 the supreme court by a vote of four
to three held that the city of Akron was not unconstitutionally deprived
of property by the Ohio Watercraft Act. This statute prohibits political
subdivisions from imposing any license fees or other charges on water-
craft owners for the privilege of operating their boats on municipal
waters.
3 1
In another decision a township zoning ordinance requiring lots to be
no less than 80,000 square feet each was held not to be confiscatory in
regard to an individual who sought to create lots of 20,000 square feet.3
2
Urban renewal raises major problems of land confiscation. Under
Cleveland's home rule charter the city can condemn land in an area de-
dared to be blighted. The courts have acknowledged their authority to
invalidate the arbitrary exercise of the police power, but, where the gov-
ernmental use of the power in public improvement is concerned, the
courts will only invalidate the action when the power is transcended, or
when fraud or gross abuse of discretion is involved. The home rule
municipality need not follow the general law of the state but can proceed
under its own charter.33
However, state statutes prohibiting erection of outdoor advertising
signs within 660 feet of the right-of-way of interstate routes were held
unconstitutional in a common pleas court as an unlawful taking of
property. 4
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30. State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777, cert. granted, 371 U.S. 808 (1962).
31. State ex tel. McElroy v. City of Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962).
32. State ex tel. Grant v. Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 181 N.E.2d 905 (1960).
33. Grisanti v. City of Cleveland, 181 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 173
Ohio St. 386, 182 N.E.2d 568, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 68 (1962).
34. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 184 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio C-P. 1962).
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